The Remedies of Specific Performance, Price Reduction and Additional Time (Nachfrist) Under the CISG: Are These Worthwhile Changes or Additions to English Sales Law? by Piliounis, Peter A.
Pace International Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 1 Spring 2000 Article 2
April 2000
The Remedies of Specific Performance, Price
Reduction and Additional Time (Nachfrist) Under
the CISG: Are These Worthwhile Changes or
Additions to English Sales Law?
Peter A. Piliounis
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter A. Piliounis, The Remedies of Specific Performance, Price Reduction and Additional Time
(Nachfrist) Under the CISG: Are These Worthwhile Changes or Additions to English Sales Law?, 12 Pace
Int'l L. Rev. 1 (2000)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss1/2
PACE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
Volume XII, Number I Spring 2000
ARTICLES
THE REMEDIES OF SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE, PRICE REDUCTION
AND ADDITIONAL TIME
(NACHFRIST) UNDER THE CISG:
ARE THESE WORTHWHILE CHANGES OR
ADDITIONS TO ENGLISH SALES LAW?
Peter A. Piliounis
INTRODUCTION
"The daily negociations and property of merchants ought not to
depend upon subtleties and niceties; but upon rules easily learned
and easily retained, because they are dictates of common sense,
drawn from the truth of the case."1
"The mercantile law, in this respect, is the same all over the world.
For, from the same premises, the sound conclusions of reason and
justice must universally be the same."2
-Lord Mansfield (1705-1793)
1 Hamilton v. Mendes, 97 Eng. Rep. 787, 795 (K.B. 1761).
2 Pelly v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co., 97 Eng. Rep. 342, 346 (K.B. 1757).
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It was apparent as long ago as the mid-eighteenth century
that lawmakers should strive for a consistent and universal
form of international mercantile law, based upon common sense
and common legal principles. More recently, this same belief
led to the development of the United Nations Conventions on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 3 (CISG or the
Convention). The CISG came into force on 1 January 19884 and
as of 3 March 2000, fifty-six countries had acceded to the Con-
vention.5 The Contracting States include most of the member
nations of the European Union (with the exception of the
United Kingdom (UK), Ireland and Portugal) and other major
British trading partners and common law countries such as the
United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. 6
While the United Kingdom Department of Trade and In-
dustry has issued two consultation papers (in 1989 and 1997) on
the subject of the UK entering into the Convention,7 no further
formal steps have been taken to adopt the CISG in the UK.
Based on the responses it received, the Department of Trade
and Industry issued a position paper in February 1999 stating
that the Convention should be brought into national law when
there is time available in the legislative programme." To date,
no further steps have been taken to bring the CISG into English
law.
In considering the adoption of the CISG, many of the sup-
porting arguments regard the Convention as a good compro-
3 Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980), available in S. Treaty Doc.
No. 98-9 (1983) and in United Nations: Conference on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, May 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter CISG].
4 See UNCITRAL Homepage (visited May 9, 2000) <http://www.uncitral.org/
english/status>.
5 See id.
6 See id.
7 See Department of Trade and Industry (UK), United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: a consultative document (London:
Department of Trade and Industry, 1989) and Department of Trade and Industry
(UK), United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(Vienna Sales Convention): a consultative document (London: Department of Trade
and Industry, 1997).
8 See Department of Trade and Industry (UK), United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna Sales Convention), position
paper (London: Department of Trade and Industry, February 1999) [hereinafter
Vienna Sales Convention].
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mise on sales law, which could lead to a useful uniform
international sales law.9 Critics of the CISG have tended to fo-
cus on the drawbacks of the Convention itself, rather than the
stated objective of uniformity or the principles espoused by Lord
Mansfield. 10 For example, Mr. Justice Hobhouse damned the
CISG and similar conventions as follows:
The utopian ideals which have led to the present situation have a
parallel in those which gave rise to the movement for the adoption
of Esperanto as a universal language. International commerce is
best served not by imposing deficient legal schemes upon it but by
encouraging the development of the best schemes in a climate of
free competition and choice.11
In light of these criticisms, this article will examine the CISG to
determine whether it would be a useful addition to (or in certain
circumstances, replacement of) English sale of goods law as it
currently exists, emphasising particular remedies available
when a sales contract is breached.
The stated purpose in the preamble of the CISG is the
"adoption of legal rules which would contribute to the removal
of legal barriers in international trade and promote interna-
tional trade."12 This article will examine whether the CISG is a
useful addition to English law in light of the stated unification
purpose of the CISG, with an emphasis on some potential ef-
fects the adoption of it may have on remedies available to En-
glish businesses now and in the future. A particularly relevant
possible future effect on English law and English businesses is
the trend within the European Union (and to a lesser extent,
worldwide) toward greater unification of the law. In light of
this feature, this article will also discuss the extent to which the
CISG reflects generally accepted common European or interna-
9 Some of these arguments were included in Department of Trade and Indus-
try, supra note 7 and in B. Nicholas, The Vienna Convention on International Sales
Law, 105 L.Q. Rev. 201 (1989).
10 According to the Department of Trade and Industry, others were reluctant
to adopt the CISG into English law because the Convention would weaken English
law as a separate choice of law for foreign parties and possibly lead to fewer parties
choosing English law or London as a centre for dispute resolution. See Vienna
Sales Convention, supra note 8.
11 J.S. Hobhouse, International Conventions and Commercial Law: The Pur-
suit of Uniformity, 106 L.Q. Rev. 531, 534-535 (1990).
12 CISG, supra note 3, at pmbl.
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tional legal principles as recognised by comparative legal schol-
ars. If the CISG remedies reflect these future legal unification
directions, they would be a useful addition to English law, as an
intermediate step toward future harmonisation or unification
efforts.
The addition of any new legal regime, whether under a con-
vention or otherwise, generally leads to a period of uncertainty
while courts and businesspeople adapt to the new rules. From
an English party's perspective, the less the deviation from the
current regime, the lower the level of uncertainty. While a full
analysis of all of the implications of the CISG on English law
would require a weighty treatise, this article will take a nar-
rower view, based on certain remedies available for breach of
contract. This article will examine some potential areas of un-
certainty based on the differences from the remedies available
under the known and understood sales law regime represented
by the Sales of Goods Act 1979 (SGA).13 Of particular import
are the new or potentially significant different remedies of spe-
cific performance, granting of additional time (often referred to
as Nachfrist) and price reduction, to illustrate the types of areas
where English parties should be aware of the changes repre-
sented by the CISG.
Remedies serve as a particularly useful case study of the
potential effects of the CISG for several reasons. First, reme-
dies available to a party are a key consideration for that party,
particularly if the contract is breached. Second, the CISG was
designed to take into account the special characteristics of the
international sale of goods, such as long distances involved,
costs of transportation and the length of the term of the con-
tracts. 14 As a result of this design, the CISG emphasises reme-
dies that seek to preserve the contract notwithstanding a
13 Sale of Goods Act (1979), ch. 54, as amended (Eng.) [hereinafter SGA].
14 See J.O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE
1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 64-65 (2d ed. 1991); New Zealand Law Com-
mission, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: New Zealand's Proposed Acceptance: Report No. 23 (Wellington: New Zea-
land Law Commission, 1992), available in CISG W3 database, Pace University
School of Law, at 23, 55,113, (May 26, 1998) <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu>
[hereinafter Pace CISG Database].
[Vol. 12:1
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss1/2
(NACHFRIST) UNDER THE CISG
breach, 15 which can have additional implications in light of En-
glish law.
Remedies for breach of contract in sales law can be broken
into two main categories: one where the contract can be termi-
nated or avoided by the parties, the other where the remedy is
granted while the contract remains in force. 16 Because parties
will typically expect their contracts to be performed, or at least
stay in effect, the primary emphasis should be on the remedies
that operate without having to avoid the contract. Additionally,
the focus in the CISG on preserving the contract notwithstand-
ing a breach could mean that these new remedies are a poten-
tial source of uncertainty, also making them a useful subject for
analysis and comparison with the existing rules under the SGA.
In such a structure, the main emphasis tends to be on the reme-
dies of the buyer, as the buyer is obtaining goods under the con-
tract, rather than the seller, who is primarily interested in
receipt of the purchase price. This article will mirror this focus,
emphasising the available buyer's remedies.
OTHER ATTEMPTS AT UNIFICATION
Since the CISG came into force in 1988, there have been
two main efforts to develop overall unifying principles covering
the field of contract law. While both of these cover a much
broader ambit than merely the sale of goods, they can be seen as
indicative of the direction contract law and sale of goods law are
likely to proceed in the future. In contrast to the governmental
negotiation and compromise leading to the CISG, both sets of
principles were drafted by an international cross-section of
academians, judges and civil servants acting in their own per-
sonal capacities, not as representatives of their own countries. 17
15 See HONNOLD, supra note 14. See also A.H. KRITZER, GUIDE TO PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTER-
NATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 342 (1980); M.G. Bridge, The Bifocal World of Interna-
tional Sales: Vienna and non-Vienna, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAw 289 (R.
Cranston ed. 1997).
16 The author notes that this categorisation was adopted by H.M. Flechtner,
Remedies under the New International Sales Convention: The Perspective from Ar-
ticle 2 of the U.C.C., 8 J.L. & COM. 53 (1988), available in Pace CISG Database,
supra note 14 (March 16, 1998).
17 The author notes that good descriptions of the working methods and proce-
dures of the commissions can be found in M.J. Bonnell, The UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European Contract
2000]
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Their purpose was to find common unifying principles, an
equivalent to the American Restatement of Law,"' which could
form the basis of future efforts at harmonisation and unifica-
tion. This is different from the CISG, where, due to the diver-
gent legal regimes and views, consensus could only be reached
on compromise solutions with some ambiguous wording and
gaps in coverage. 19 Unlike the CISG, the other efforts at unifi-
cation were not bound to take the viewpoints of every single
country, legal regime or rule into account. The final choice
among possibly conflicting rules was made on the persuasive-
ness or suitability of the rule within the overall regime. 20 These
other efforts can thus be seen as a more unified and coherent
regime than the CISG. These regimes definitely are a step for-
ward in legal thinking and the number of similarities between
the two regimes suggests that they represent the main direc-
tions being taken by international contract law.
The regime covering the greatest geographical scope is the
work of the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law (usually referred to as UNIDROIT) and their Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT Principles).21
The scope of the UNIDROIT Principles is international and sets
forth "general rules for international commercial contracts."
22
While the international nature is similar to the CISG, the
UNIDROIT Principles are broader in scope and more detailed
in provisions than the CISG.
Of more import for England are the efforts of the Commis-
sion of European Contract Law (often referred to in practice as
the "Lando Commission", after the Commission's head, Ole
Lando). In 1995, the Lando Commission published the first
Law: Similar Rules for the Same Purposes?, 26 UNIFORM L. REV. 229, 229-246
(1996), available in Pace CISG Database, supra note 14 (May 12, 1998).
18 See M.J. Bonnell, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts and CISG -Alternatives or Complementary Instruments?, 26 UNIFORM L.
REV. 26, 26-39 (1996), available in Pace CISG Database, supra note 14 (May 12,
1998); Bonnell, supra note 17; THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW - PART
1: PERFORMANCE, NON-PERFORMANCE AND REMEDIES xx (0. Lando & H. Beale eds.
1995) [hereinafter Lando & Beale].
19 See Bonnell, supra note 18.
20 See id.
21 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law ("UNIDROIT"),
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (Rome: UNIDROIT, 1994).
22 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 21, at pmbl.
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part of its Principles of European Contract Law (the PECL).23
The specific history of the PECL also merits some mention. In
1989, the European Parliament passed a resolution in favour of
pursuing a European Code of Private Law.24 In 1994, this in-
tent manifested itself with a resolution in favour of the Lando
Commission's efforts at the harmonisation of contract law.
25
Therefore, in addition to the express purpose of being applied
"as general rules of contract law in the European Communi-
ties,"26 the PECL are intended to represent a modern European
lex mercatoria27 and most importantly for future legal develop-
ments, "as a model on which [European] harmonisation work
may be based."28 So while the PECL are of a narrower geo-
graphic focus than the UNIDROIT Principles, it covers a wider
area of law, plus it has been developed with the laws of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) countries (including England) in mind.
The development of the PECL is particularly important for
the future development of English law, considering the contin-
ued activism of the European Commission in further
harmonisation efforts. 29 As an example, although neither the
PECL nor the CISG are expressly mentioned as an inspiration
for the remedies section, a recent draft directive of the Euro-
pean Commission on Guarantees for Consumer Goods 30 has re-
medial provisions which mirror both the PECL and the CISG
fairly closely.3 1 Additionally, if the PECL will in fact be used by
EU entities in interpreting European contract law or as the ba-
23 Lando & Beale, supra note 18. The author notes that since then, the Lando
Commission has developed Part II of the PECL, which has resulted in some re-
numbering of the provisions of Part I and which is expected to be published
shortly. For ease of reference, this article will cite the numbering from both ver-
sions for the remedies referred to herein.
24 Resolution of 26 May 1989, OJEC No. C 158/401.
25 See Resolution on the Harmonization of Certain Sectors of the Private Law
of the Member States, 6 May 1994, OJEC No. C 205/457.
26 PECL, art. 1.101.
27 See Lando & Beale, supra note 18, at xviii.
28 Id.
29 The author notes that a recent directive that had a significant effect on
private law is the Products Liability Directive, Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J.
(L 210) 29.
30 OJEC 1998 C148/12, COM (1998) 217, amending COM (1995) 520.
31 See M.G. BRIDGE, THE SALE OF GOODS x-xi (1998) (suggesting that the CISG
is the inspiration for the remedial provisions of the draft directive).
2000]
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sis for further harmonisation efforts, they are particularly im-
portant to consider as indicating future legal developments.
EFFECT OF CHOICE OF REMEDIES BY THE PARTIES
The discussions in this article are premised on the assump-
tion that the parties have not chosen some other remedy or rem-
edies within their contractual relationship. Any such remedies
chosen by the parties would obviously fall outside the scope of
this article. The CISG generally gives effect to the principle of
freedom of contract of the parties, which is typified in Article 6,
which reads: "The parties may exclude the application of the
Convention or, subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary the
effect of any of its provisions."32
A literal reading of this article means that the Convention
gives the parties the authority to determine in their contract all
of the remedies to which they will be subject upon breach. This
concept does not in itself lead to uncertainty. A contract could
specify, for example, that the parties choose to be governed by
the remedial scheme under the SGA rather than under the
CISG. While the SGA recognises the same general concept
(which is a fundamental aspect of English contract law), the
scope of the equivalent provision in the SGA is somewhat
narrower.
33
The potential for uncertainty depends on the types of reme-
dies chosen by the parties. One such example in the context of
this article would be if the parties operating under the CISG
specifically agreed that the only available remedy was specific
performance. 34 Under English law,35 specific performance is a
discretionary remedy. 36 While it is unlikely that the parties
would agree to such a remedy, there would be no conflict be-
32 CISG, supra note 3, art. 6. Article 12 deals with reservations made by the
Contracting States to the Convention, which the parties are unable to derogate or
vary.
33 Section 55(1) of the Sale of Goods Act, allows the parties to negate or vary
'a right duty or liability," which is arguably narrower than the scope of Article 12
of the CISG. See SGA, supra note 13, § 55(1).
34 For example, excluding the operation of Article 12 of the CISG.
35 For a more complete discussion regarding the positions of English law and
the CISG, see infra Part IV.
36 The author notes that a general discussion of the exceptional nature of the
remedy can be found in G. JONEs & W. GOODHART, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 1-23
(1996).
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tween the agreement for specific performance and Article 46 of
the CISG.3 On the other hand, an English court applying gen-
eral legal principles would be unlikely to grant specific perform-
ance where the court did not consider that the situation merited
the exercise of discretion in favour of specific performance.A8
An issue more likely to arise is the question of the quantum
of damages agreed by the parties. Under the CISG, there is no
limit on the amount of compensation that may be agreed to be
paid upon breach of a contract. In contrast, English common
law draws a distinction between genuine pre-estimates of dam-
age (referred to as "liquidated damages") versus clauses viewed
as punitive or penal.39 Penalty clauses are considered invalid
and will not be enforced by an English court. So while the par-
ties are generally free to choose their own remedies, English
law will not enforce all of the remedies, at least not to the same
degree.
This becomes a clearer problem in the context of the CISG.
Article 4 of the CISG sets forth the scope of the CISG and ex-
pressly excludes "the validity of the contract or of any of its pro-
visions or of any usage."40 Although the CISG does give the
parties the freedom to choose their own remedies, it is not nec-
essarily clear that these remedies will be enforced the same way
in every country, if at all. In the example given above, whether
a damages clause was enforced would likely depend on whether
penalty clauses were considered a question of validity under the
CISG or whether the freedom of choice granted by Article 6
overrode Article 4. Some commentators have suggested that
whether a particular predetermined damages clause is unen-
forceable as a penalty clause is based in public policy and there-
fore a question of validity of the particular clause. 41 Under such
an analysis, the parties' freedom of choice would be overridden
37 Also, if there was no relevant application of Article 28. See infra pt. IV.
38 Examples include: want of mutuality, requirement for court supervision
and adequacy of damages. See JoNEs & GOODHART, supra note 36, at ch.2.
39 This is discussed in more detail in G.H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT
898-906 (1995).
40 CISG, supra note 3, art. 4(a).
41 E. A. Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 247
(1979), available in Pace CISG Database, supra note 14 (Sept. 2, 1998). See also
Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/5, published in Official
Records U.N. Doc. 97/9, 14-66, art. 42 cmt. 1 10, reprinted in Pace CISG Database,
2000]
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by the applicable (domestic) law in some jurisdictions, but not
others.
This uncertainty regarding the extent to which remedies
chosen by the parties are enforceable in any given forum is a
drawback to the CISG that does not currently exist under the
SGA. This uncertainty, however, exists without the CISG
where the parties choose one domestic legal regime and the con-
tract and remedies chosen are litigated in another legal regime.
There is no guarantee that each jurisdiction will interpret the
remedy chosen by the parties in the same way
SPECIFIC/ENFORCED PERFORMANCE
Specific performance can be viewed as particularly impor-
tant in the context of international trade. 42 In international
trade, a great deal of time and effort may be incurred by the
innocent buyer in finding an alternate supply of the goods con-
tracted for. While an award of damages may compensate the
buyer for any tangible additional expense incurred (if it can be
calculated), the buyer is more likely to face some loss or detri-
ment unless it can get the seller to perform the contract. This is
in contrast with a domestic situation where replacement of
goods may be more readily available.
a) Traditional English Law Approach
Under English law, granting specific performance of the
terms of a contract is an extraordinary remedy, granted in very
limited circumstances. 43 This position is reflected in Section
52(1) of the SGA, which reads:
In any action for breach of contract to deliver specific or ascer-
tained goods the court may, if it thinks fit, on the plaintiffs appli-
cation, by its judgment or decree direct that the contract shall be
supra note 14 (Sept. 2, 1998) This author notes that this is roughly equivalent to
Article 46 of the CISG [hereinafter Secretariat Commentary].
42 See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 41, at 38. See also A.H. Kastely,
The Right to Require Perfomrance in International Sales: Towards an Interna-
tional Interpretation of the Vienna Convention, 64 WASH. L. REV. 607 (1988).
43 The author notes that a good description of the general English law ap-
proach to specific performance and contractual remedies generally can be found in
a speech given by Lord Hoffman in Co-Operative Insurance Society Ltd. v. Argyll
Stores (Q.B. 1997) AC. See also G.H. TRIETEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CON
TRACT: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT 43 (1988).
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performed specifically, without giving the defendant the option of
retaining the goods on payment of damages.
There are several elements of this provision that are important
to note in the context of the CISG. In particular, certain aspects
of the English law and SGA approach to specific performance
are themselves open to misinterpretation and/or uncertainty.
Section 52(1) limits specific performance to those circum-
stances involving "specific" or "ascertained" goods. In other
words, Section 52(1) only applies to goods "identified and agreed
on at the time a contract of sale is made"4 4 or "identified in ac-
cordance with the agreement after the time a contract of sale is
made."45 On its face then, Section 52(1) is only meant to apply
in limited circumstances involving limited types of goods. The
mere fact that specific or ascertained goods are involved, how-
ever, is no guarantee that the court will exercise its discretion
and order specific performance, including instances where the
buyer was put to significant hardship in obtaining any sort of
replacement good, such as custom machinery46 or a ship.47 This
discretionary approach to specific performance is, by its very
nature, uncertain. A plaintiff seeking specific performance has
no means of knowing whether the remedy will be granted even
if successful on the merits of the case where either a unique or
semi-unique good is involved.
Further uncertainty arises in connection with Section 52(1)
from a lack of consensus regarding the nature of the SGA itself.
Some view the SGA as a codification of the common law (and
equity) regarding sales law, meaning that the only remedies
available to the parties are those expressly set forth in the SGA,
while others consider the SGA to operate in addition to any
other remedies available at common law or equity.48 For the
44 SGA, supra note 13, at ch. 52(1).
45 Re Wait [1927] Ch 606 at 630, per Atkin, L.J.
46 See Societe des Industries Metallurgiques SA c. Bronx Engineering Co.
Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 465 (K.B. 1975).
47 See C.N. Marine Inc. v. Stena Line, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 336 (C.A. 1982). As per
Article 2(e), the CISG does not apply to sales of "ships, vessels, hovercraft or
aircraft."
48 See SGA, supra note 13, § 62(2) which states that the common law contin-
ues to apply where inconsistent with the terms of that Sale of Goods Act. This can
be contrasted with other common law jurisdictions whose legislation is based on
the SGA, e.g., New South Wales Sale of Goods Act 1923, where Section 56 states
that all remedies are still available in equity, but does not contain an equivalent to
20001
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purpose of specific performance, this is particularly relevant in
considering whether the remedy can be granted for unascer-
tained goods. This narrow "codification" view was taken in the
leading case of Re Wait,49 where the majority refused to grant
an order of specific performance for what it considered to be un-
ascertained goods. In that case, Atkin L.J. stated that "The
sum total of legal relations (meaning by the word 'legal' existing
in equity as well as in common law) arising out of the contract
for the sale of goods may well be regarded as defined by the
Code [the SGA]". 50 This view of codification has been criticised
by some commentators 51 and has not been consistently applied
in all cases.
In the case of Sky Petroleum Ltd. v. VIP Petroleum Ltd.,52
the parties had a long-term contract for the supply of petrol to a
filling station. When the seller defaulted, the buyer was unable
to locate an alternate supply of petrol due to an interruption of
supply as a result of the Yom Kippur War. Given the circum-
stances, the court exercised its discretion to grant a decree of
specific performance. As a precedent for such a remedy, Sky Pe-
troleum was weakened by the fact that the court failed to dis-
cuss whether in fact it had the power to grant such a remedy
under the circumstances or how the remedy fit into Section 52,
the decision of Re Wait or even the general remedial structure of
the SGA. Subsequent cases have questioned the authority of
Sky Petroleum for the sale of goods. 53 Based on these decisions,
English case law is unsettled on this point. The precise scope of
when a court might have the power or discretion to grant spe-
cific performance is therefore unclear. Any new regime to be
implemented in the CISG or other sales laws will have the op-
portunity to clarify English law on this point.
Section 52(1) of the SGA. See BRIDGE, supra note 31, at 6-10 for a discussion of the
role of equity in modem sales law in England.
49 [1927] Ch 606.
50 Id. at 636.
51 See, e.g., G.H. Treitel, Specific Performance in the Sale of Goods J.B.L. 211,
223-224 (1966).
52 1 W.L.R. 576 (1974).
53 See In Re London Wine Company (Shippers) Limited, [1986] PCC 121, at
149 (considering the situation in Sky Petroleum to be a long term supply contract
rather than a contract for the sale of goods).
[Vol. 12:1
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss1/2
(NACHFRIST) UNDER THE CISG
The language used in Section 52(1) of the SGA, contrasted
with the placement of the section within the SGA, also leads to
potential uncertainty in exceptional circumstances. Section
52(1) makes no reference to "buyer" or "seller", but instead re-
fers to "plaintiff' and "defendant".54 At the same time, Section
52(1) is in the SGA under the heading "Buyer's remedies".55
Based on this ambiguity, some have argued that in theory a
seller can sue for specific performance, 56 while others state cat-
egorically that only the buyer has a right to ask for specific per-
formance. 57 In practice, this ambiguity is not an issue. Specific
performance is usually a remedy sought only by a buyer, since
specific performance for the seller is usually receipt of the
purchase price, which can almost always be compensated for by
damages or by an action for payment of the purchase price
under Section 49 of the SGA. The limitation contained in Sec-
tion 52(1) of the SGA concerning ascertained goods would also
be meaningless in connection with an action by the seller for
specific performance. Since the seller is usually the responsible
party for identifying and ascertaining the goods, the seller could
easily avoid this limitation5 8 by ascertaining the goods before
seeking a decree of specific performance.
Despite these practical considerations, it is conceivable in
some circumstances that a seller would prefer to force the buyer
to take delivery of the goods rather than trying to sell the goods
elsewhere and trying to recover any losses through an award of
damages. Treitel5 9 combined several of the unclear points to il-
lustrate a situation where it would be appropriate for a seller to
seek specific performance. A seller could have contracted to
supply all of the requirements of the buyer's manufacturing
54 SGA, supra note 13, § 52(1).
55 For further information on the use of headings to interpret English stat-
utes, see Halsbury's Laws of England vol. 44(1), 1 1411 (4th ed. 1995).
56 See, e.g., MICHAEL FURMSTON, SALE AND SUPPLY OF GOODS 173 (2d ed.
1990); Treitel, supra note 51, at 229-230; LARSHMAN MARASINGHE, CONTRACT OF
SALE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 178 (1992). This issue could also turn on
whether the SGA exempts all non-enumerated remedies, since before the SGA, in
Buxton v. Lister, 26 Eng. Rep. 1020, 1021 (1746), the court assumed that a seller
could obtain an order for specific performance.
57 See, e.g., P.S. ATiYAH & J.N. ADAms, THE SALE OF GOODS 507 (9th ed. 1995).
58 That is, if this limitation does exist. See supra this part regarding whether
specific performance is an available remedy for unascertained goods.
59 See Treitel, supra note 51, at 230.
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business over an extended period of time (therefore the goods
are neither specific nor necessarily ascertained) for a contracted
price. The seller may have made a significant initial invest-
ment and the market price might vary in such a way as to make
any damage award speculative. Under these circumstances,
the seller has some justification to seek specific performance.
However the actual position under English law is unclear as to
whether a court would have the ability to make such a decree.
b) CISG Provisions
The equivalent provision to Section 52(1) of the SGA is con-
tained in Article 46 of the CISG which provides that a "buyer
may require performance of the seller of his obligations unless
the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with
this requirement." Unlike the SGA, the CISG also contains a
provision in favour of the seller in Article 62 to require the
buyer to "pay the price, take delivery or perform his other obli-
gations." As discussed above, the addition of a provision al-
lowing specific performance in favour of the seller is unlikely to
have a significant practical effect except in exceptional circum-
stances.6 0 Consequently, the main focus below will be on the
ability of the buyer to obtain specific performance.
There is no requirement under Articles 46 or 62 of the
CISG that the goods be specific, ascertained or otherwise identi-
fied under the contract. On this basis, the CISG avoids some of
the uncertainty associated with the scope of specific perform-
ance under the SGA. The only limitation on the buyer's ability
to demand specific performance is resorting to a remedy which
is inconsistent with specific performance. As with the SGA, the
buyer is not precluded from claiming damages in addition to a
claim for specific performance.6 1 Some types of remedies that
60 In such circumstances, although unclear, English law might grant a rem-
edy. Additionally, an action for the price under Section 49 of the SGA can be
characterised under the CISG as essentially specific performance of the buyer's
obligation to pay the price. See Kastely, supra note 42, at pt. I.C.2.a; J.S. Zeigel,
The Remedial Provisions in the Vienna Sales Convention: Some Common Law Per-
spectives, in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CON-
TRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 9-1, 9-30 (N.M. Galston & H. Smit
eds. 1984).
61 See CISG, supra note 3, arts. 45(1), 45(2); HONNOLD, supra note 14, at 277-
278. Treitel, wonders whether the reverse is necessarily true but if the CISG con-
templates damages coexisting with specific performance, damages would not nec-
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would be considered inconsistent are avoidance of the contract
under Articles 26, 49 or 81 or reduction of the contract price
under Article 50 (which is discussed below). 62
The first obvious difference between Section 52(1) of the
SGA and Article 46 of the CISG is the difference in emphasis on
who may pursue the remedy. Specific performance under the
SGA is a discretionary remedy granted by the court. Yet under
the CISG, it is the option of the buyer to require specific per-
formance on the part of the seller, without any requirement of
resorting to a court. According to the Secretariat Commentary
on Article 42 of a previous draft of the CISG (roughly equivalent
to Article 46), this style was chosen to reflect "the view in many
legal systems that a legislative text on the law of sales governs
the rights and obligations between the parties and does not con-
sist of directives addressed to a tribunal."63
Despite this apparent difference in focus, the practical ef-
fect of such different wording is uncertain. In fact, the Secreta-
riat Commentary indicates that this different style of legislative
drafting is intended to achieve the same result. 64 In any event,
one would anticipate that the typical buyer would desire and
expect the seller to specifically perform its obligations before
pursuing any remedies before a court. Likewise, since damages
are the primary remedy under English law, a court is unlikely
to make an award for specific performance unless requested by
the plaintiff/buyer.
Where the difference in wording and emphasis could have
its greatest effect is on the court itself in determining whether
to grant a remedy of specific performance. Under the SGA, dis-
cretion is clearly granted to the court, while the CISG makes no
mention of any court discretion. On this basis, it might be ex-
pected that specific performance would be granted more fre-
quently under the CISG than is currently the case under the
SGA. Once again, this difference is more apparent than real.
Article 28 of the CISG contains a substantial limitation on the
essarily be an inconsistent remedy unless they somehow precluded specific
performance, such as a typical English law award of damages as a sole remedy in
lieu of specific performance. See Treitel, supra note 43, at 51.
62 See Steven Walt, For Specific Performance Under the United Nations Sales
Convention, 26 TExAs INT'L. L. J. 211, 214 (1991).
63 Secretariat Commentary, supra note 41, at 41.
64 See id.
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ability of a party to obtain specific performance in certain cir-
cumstances. It states:
If, in accordance with this Convention, one party is entitled to re-
quire performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is
not bound to enter a judgment for specific performance unless the
court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts
of sale not governed by this Convention.6 5
On that basis, any determination by an English court on
whether to grant specific performance would require the court
to look back at existing English law to decide whether the court
would in fact grant the award. In other words, the court would
refer to the traditional rules encompassed in Section 52(1) of
the SGA discussed above in order to exercise its discretion in
accordance with that provision.
While this escape clause is useful from the perspective of an
English party (in that its legal position is not changed due to
the CISG), it flies in the face of the CISG's stated goal of seeking
uniformity. 66 When Articles 28 and 46 are read together there
is clearly a compromise among the primary remedy of damages
under common law systems (such as England), the primary
remedy of performance in civil law systems 67 and the remedies
in those jurisdictions where a court is prohibited from awarding
specific performance. In each case it allows a country's court to
determine whether it would grant specific performance based
on the parameters of its own domestic law at the expense of
commercial certainty or uniformity of remedy to be granted. 68
While there are no reported cases from other jurisdictions 69
that grant specific performance, it is highly conceivable that
65 CISG, supra note 3, art. 28.
66 See CISG, supra note 3, at pmbl.
67 This compromise is discussed and largely criticised by M. Will, in M.C. Br-
ANCA & M.J. BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw 333-334
(1987). See also Walt, supra note 62, at 218-224; Kastely, supra note 42, at pt. I.C.;
Zeigel, supra note 60, at 9-9; Farnsworth, supra note 41. An illustration of a civil
law approach to specific performance can be found in Article 1184 of the French
Code Civile. The civilian approach is generally said to be a reflection of the Roman
legal maxim of pacta sunt servanda.
68 See Kastely, supra note 42, at pt. I.C.
69 This author notes that there are several internet sites which collate deci-
sions made worldwide relating to the CISG, many of which are translated into
English. On a review of the available material in English conducted in April 1999,
there were no such reported cases.
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specific performance would be granted in another jurisdiction in
circumstances where an English court would not do so or vice
versa. Apart from the uncertainty created by the inconsistency
in remedies available in different jurisdictions, there is also the
potential for forum shopping by a plaintiff seeking specific per-
formance or a defendant seeking to avoid specific
performance. 7
c) Potential Future Legal Directions
The CISG can be viewed as a missed opportunity to clarify
the law relating to specific performance. One aspect that the
CISG could have introduced into English law is the possible
broadening of the narrow circumstances where specific perform-
ance is generally granted. The provision contained in Section
52(1) of the SGA was originally introduced in the mid-nine-
teenth century in order to encourage more liberal granting of
specific performance. 71 Bridge72 has stated that this provision
has in fact had the opposite effect, since Section 52(1) speaks
only of specific or ascertained goods, rather than all goods. Re-
gardless of the reason, there has been a definite paucity of deci-
sions where specific performance has been granted. The rules
relating to specific performance in the sale of goods have been
criticised as being too strict and resulting in unfair results in
certain cases where replacement goods are not readily availa-
ble. 73 Other common law jurisdictions, such as the United
States, have already shown a greater willingness to grant spe-
cific performance than English courts.74
70 See Will, supra note 67, at 341; Zeigel, supra note 60, at 9-11; Walt, supra
note 62, at 230-232 (suggesting that as a practical matter the chance of forum
shopping is curtailed due to the limited reliance of parties on specific
performance).
71 See BRIDGE, supra note 31, at 531; Treitel, supra note 51, at 217-219; Onta-
rio Law Reform Commission, Report on Sale of Goods Vol. II. at 437 (Toronto: On-
tario Ministry of the Attorney General 1979).
72 See BRIDGE, supra note 31 at 532; But see Sky Petroleum, 1 W.L.R. 576.
73 See, e.g., R. GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW 387-388 (2d ed. 1995); BRIDGE, supra
note 31, at 531-536; Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 71, Vol. II at
437-439; Treitel, supra note 51.
74 See Treitel, supra note 43, at 64; Walt, supra note 62; J.M. Catalano, More
Fiction than Fact: The Perceived Differences in the Application of Specific Perform-
ance under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1807 (1997).
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Instead of allowing a broader approach to specific perform-
ance, the new regime introduced by the CISG allows the En-
glish courts to continue to apply the traditional restrictive
regime while sacrificing the potential benefits of uniformity of
remedies. While this approach was a useful compromise to al-
low the international delegates to approve the CISG, it is an
unsatisfactory solution that is unlikely to be adopted in future
legal unification or harmonisation efforts.
There is some scope for English judges to use the CISG to
expand the doctrine of specific performance based on the word-
ing of Article 28, which only states that a court "is not bound to
enter a judgment for specific performance [emphasis added]"
unless it would do so under its domestic law. It does not ex-
pressly limit specific performance to those circumstances al-
lowed under English law. 75 Article 28 is therefore framed in a
discretionary rather than a mandatory manner.7 6 An English
court could choose to apply Article 46(1) to grant specific per-
formance where it might not be clearly available under the
SGA. However, given the traditional reluctance of English
courts to exercise their discretion under the existing language
of Section 52(1) of the SGA or to broaden the ambit of the rem-
edy in those circumstances outlined above, it is highly unlikely
that the English courts will use this opportunity to expand the
doctrine.
Other approaches to the unification of contract law have
been more successful in introducing a more coherent and cer-
tain scheme regarding specific performance than in the CISG.
The clearest example for specific performance can be found in
the UNIDROIT Principles, which follow the civil law approach
to make specific performance the primary remedy, subject to
certain exceptions. Article 7.2.2 reads:
Where a party who owes an obligation other than one to pay
money does not perform, the other party may require perform-
ance, unless
(a) performance is impossible in law or in fact;
75 An example of mandatory wording is "a court shall not grant specific per-
formance unless it would do so under its domestic law."
76 See Kastely, supra note 42, at pt. I.C.2.c (asserting that this view is shared
by most commentators on the Convention).
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(b) performance or, where relevant, enforcement is unreasonably
burdensome or expensive;
(c) the party entitled to performance may reasonably obtain per-
formance from another source;
(d) performance is of an exclusively personal character; or
(e) the party entitled to performance does not require perform-
ance within a reasonable time after it has, or ought to have,
become aware of the non-performance. 77
The PECL takes a similar approach. 78 Unlike the SGA or the
CISG (with the effect of Article 28), the remedy is not discre-
tionary. A court must award specific performance unless one of
the enumerated exceptions is met. An analysis of the intrica-
cies of this particular specific performance remedy is beyond the
scope of this article, but it is illustrative of a completely differ-
ent compromise than that reached in the CISG. To adopt such
an approach in England at this point would be a complete de-
parture from the traditional approach of English law and is
therefore inadvisable without further study. For the time be-
ing, the CISG is a useful addition in respect of specific perform-
ance only to the extent that it forms part of an international
convention. Otherwise, it does not add any uniformity, cer-
tainty or a desirable remedy to English law.
GRANTING ADDITIONAL TIME TO DEFAULTING PARTY
A remedy that allows one party to grant additional time to
the other party is not really a stand alone remedy in the tradi-
tional sense. It fits very closely with other remedies, particu-
larly those that allow the parties to repudiate the contract.
While details of the question of repudiation are not expressly
dealt with in this article, the interaction between the granting
of additional time and other remedies, including repudiation or
avoidance of the contract, can differ substantially.
One would expect that any ability to grant additional time
to perform would mostly be used where there has been some
delay in performance by the defaulting party, such as delay in
delivery by the seller or delay in payment by the buyer. The
additional time gives the defaulting party time to cure its per-
formance by making delivery or paying the purchase price. The
77 CISG, supra note 3, art. 7.2.2.
78 See PECL, supra note 26, arts. 4.102(1), 9.102(1).
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opportunity to cure defective performance can be a significant
help to the seller where it has delivered the goods but the per-
formance is otherwise tainted, such as by defective goods. In
that situation, the seller could use the additional time to cure
the defective performance, as in Article 48 of the CISG,79 such
as by repairing the goods.
a) CISG Provisions
English law (discussed below) has no express remedy deal-
ing with the granting of additional time to a defaulting party.
By contrast, the CISG has borrowed a concept used in other le-
gal systems80 to include a specific remedy tied into the granting
of additional time.8 1 Article 47 outlines the scope of the remedy
as follows:
(1) The buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable
length for performance by the seller of his obligations.
(2) Unless the buyer has received notice from the seller that he
will not perform within the period so fixed, the buyer may not,
during that period, resort to any remedy for breach of con-
tract. However, the buyer is not deprived thereby of any right
he may have to claim damages for delay in performance.8 2
The remedy in Article 47 was designed to be a companion to
Article 4683 and is often referred to as Nachfrist, after the Ger-
man law remedy of similar effect. It also ties in with Article 33,
which fixes the time in which the seller must deliver the goods.
A similar remedy in favour of the seller is set forth in Article 63,
which is connected with timing obligations of the buyer in such
79 Article 48 of the CISG gives the seller the right to "cure" a non-conforming
delivery by repairing or replacing non-conforming goods within a reasonable time.
While the SGA contains no identical provision, it is a common clause in sales con-
tracts, particularly for manufactured goods. Furthermore, the requirement of the
innocent party to mitigate its damages would likely oblige the buyer to accept the
seller's offer to cure where (i) the non-conformity does not amount to breach of an
essential term, or (ii) the buyer has elected to keep the goods. See J.S. Zeigel & C.
Samson, Report to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada on Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (July 1981), excerpt reprinted in Pace
CISG Database, supra note 14 (Feb. 19, 1999); Payzu Ltd. v. Saunders, 2 K.B. 581
(1919).
80 See Will, supra note 67, at 342; KRITZER, supra note 15, at 355-356.
81 See CISG, supra note 3, art. 47.
82 Id.
83 See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 41, at 39.
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provisions as Article 38(1) (examination) and Article 59 (pay-
ment of the price).
As discussed above, Article 47 is not really a remedy of its
own; it is meant to fit into the CISG concept of fundamental
breach.8 4 The primary purpose of Article 47 is to protect the
buyer who is waiting for a delayed delivery. While waiting, the
buyer might have to determine at what point the delay consti-
tutes such a fundamental breach that the buyer becomes enti-
tled to avoid or repudiate the contract.85 Where the buyer is in
doubt whether the seller has committed a fundamental breach,
the buyer can declare an additional period of time under Article
47 for performance of the contract. This period must be "rea-
sonable" (though there is no definition in the CISG of what
would constitute a reasonable time). After the expiry of this pe-
riod the buyer can consider a fundamental breach to have oc-
curred and avoid the contract. This would apply regardless of
whether the breach would otherwise have been considered fun-
damental. The buyer's ability to avoid the contract after the de-
livery of a Nachfrist notice is outlined in Article 49(1)(b), s6
which reads:
The buyer may declare the contract avoided ...
(b) in case of non-delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods
within the additional period of time fixed by the buyer in ac-
cordance with paragraph 1 of article 47 or declares that he
will not deliver within the period so fixed.8 7
The combination of Articles 47 and 49(1)(b) lead to some
uncertainty as to the full effect of Article 47 as a remedy. Arti-
cle 47 states that additional time may be granted to allow the
seller to perform its "obligations", while Article 49(1)(b) speaks
only avoidance in regard of the delivery obligation. The oppor-
tunity of the buyer to avoid the contract where the seller has
breached an obligation other than a delivery obligation is lim-
ited to cases where there is in fact a fundamental breach. This
84 See id. See also Zeigel & Samson, supra note 79, at commentary on Article
47.
85 See HONNOLD, supra note 14, at 386.
86 The companion provision in favour of the seller is found in Article 64(1)(a),
which applies when the buyer's obligation to take delivery or pay the price is not
met.
87 CISG, supra note 3, art. 49(1)(b).
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means that if a buyer gives a Nachfrist notice in such circum-
stances, the effect of the notice will be that the buyer will be
prohibited from resorting to any other remedy for breach of con-
tract during the period of such notice.
During this period, the seller would certainly have the op-
portunity to cure the breach, but the buyer would be precluded
from taking any remedial action. This prohibition is useful pro-
tection for the defaulting seller who may be trying to perform or
cure the contract, perhaps at significant expense.88 From the
buyer's perspective, it is unclear what purpose a Nachfrist no-
tice would serve in those circumstances. Instead of offering a
remedy to the buyer, it instead imposes a burden.8 9 Perhaps
fortunately for the buyer, after the expiry of the notice, the
buyer would still be entitled to any of the other remedies al-
lowed by the CISG.
b) Contrasted with Traditional English Law Approach
English law has no direct counterpart to the delivery of a
Nachfrist notice. Perhaps the closest corollary can be found in
the rules relating to breach of timing obligations by a party and
whether such breach allows the other party to avoid the con-
tract. Avoidance of a contract under the SGA does not rely on a
"fundamental breach" analysis; instead, the analysis is on the
importance to the parties of the obligation being breached
under the contract.9 0 Generally speaking, the breach of a major
term, referred to as a "condition," allows repudiation, while the
breach of a lesser term, referred to as a "warranty," only allows
a claim for damages.
This approach has an advantage over the fundamental
breach concept used by the CISG as the parties should be able
to determine relatively easily whether a particular breach al-
lows for termination of the contract, depending on the precise
term that is breached. It adds to the certainty of the situation,
although perhaps at the expense of the flexibility inherent in
the fundamental breach concept. Despite the apparent clarity
of the situation, there is still scope for ambiguity.
88 See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 41, at 39.
89 See KRirzFR, supra note 15, at 356.
90 This author notes that discussions of the SGA approach can be found in
GOODE, supra note 73, at 128-130; BRIDGE, supra note 31, at 146-162.
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Apart from items specifically designated as conditions and
warranties in the SGA,91 whether a particular provision consti-
tutes a condition or warranty is subject to interpretation. Fur-
thermore, Section 11(3) of the SGA makes it clear that whether
a particular provision constitutes a condition or warranty de-
pends on the construction of the contract. It also suggests, by
implication, that all terms in the contract are either conditions
or warranties. 92 This, too, is over-simplistic, since the courts
have developed a third class of terms, referred to as "innomi-
nate," where breach may or may not lead to a right of repudia-
tion, depending on the seriousness of the breach.93
Considering that the right of repudiation arises under the
CISG only where the Nachfrist notice expires after a failure of
the seller to deliver (or the failure of the buyer to make pay-
ment) it is important to consider whether a breach of those par-
ticular timing obligations under English law gives rise to a
right to repudiate. It can further be considered whether the ef-
fect of any notice setting additional time would have any effect
on such right.
i) Breach of timing obligations
Section 10 of the SGA is the starting point for the analysis
of any questions on timing. It states (in part):
(1) Unless a different intention appears from the terms of the
contract, stipulations as to time of payment are not of the es-
sence of a contract of sale.
(2) Whether any other stipulation as to time is or is not of the
essence of the contract depends on the terms of the contract.
94
Sections 10(1) and 10(2) make no mention of conditions and
warranties, which are the standard methods of determining
when a right of repudiation arises. Instead, a different classifi-
cation is offered, which is whether time is or is not of the es-
91 These are predominantly set forth in Sections 12-15 of the SGA, particu-
larly after the amendments introduced by the Sale and Supply of Goods Act, 1994,
Section 7.
92 See BRIDGE, supra note 31, at 151.
93 See Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., 2
Q.B. 26 (1962).
94 SGA, supra note 13, § 10.
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sence. 95 While not always explicitly described as such, where
time is considered of the essence, time obligations are viewed as
conditions in contracts of sale. 96 This is illustrated by a situa-
tion in which a breach of a time obligation leads to a right of
the other party to repudiate the contract.97 The results of these
provisions are twofold.98 First, a breach (by way of delay) by
the buyer of payment obligations does not prima facie give rise
to a right of the seller to repudiate the contract. Second, any
other time obligation does not clearly allow for repudiation,
since it depends on the construction of the contract.
Pursuant to Section 10(1),99 the seller can only make a
claim in damages where the buyer has delayed by such a sub-
stantial amount that the breach allows the seller to repudiate
the contract. 100 Such a situation could arise in one of two ways:
(1) a court considered the time stipulation to be of the essence,
or (2) where time is not of the essence, the delay in payment
ultimately became a failure to pay, allowing for repudiation.
The question of what length of delay allows for repudiation is
the type of question that the CISG is trying to avoid by allowing
a Nachfrist notice. Where there is a delay in payment, the
seller is left to determine on its own whether the payment delay
is of such a length that the breach allows it to avoid the con-
tract. If the seller is incorrect in its assessment, it can become
liable in damages to the buyer for breach of contract. In prac-
tice this situation would rarely arise because delivery and prop-
erty in the goods typically have already passed before the delay
in payment arises. In those circumstances, the seller is re-
stricted to making a claim in damages for non-payment of the
95 See BRIDGE, supra note 31, at 213.
96 But see Bunge Corp. v. Tradax, 2 All E.R. 513, 540 (1981) (expressly dis-
cussing a time clause as being a "condition." The reasoning of Lord Lowry ex-
pressly admits that to treat time stipulations of the essence means to treat them as
conditions. See id. at 544-545.).
97 Id. Examples of the apparent interchangeability of the terms can be seen
in Halsbury's Laws of England, supra note 55, Vol. 41, 686. See also GOODE,
supra note 73, at 129.
98 The following discussion assumes that the parties have agreed on a date (as
is typical in commercial contracts). Without such agreement, the obligations must
be carried out in a reasonable time. See, e.g., SGA, supra note 13, § 29(3).
99 It is not clear whether the courts do in fact follow Section 10(1), since they
often do construe time to be of the essence in the contract, which reflects the pre-
SGA common law cases. See BRIDGE, supra note 31, at 213-214.
100 See Halsbury's Laws of England, supra note 55, at vol. 9(1) 1 931.
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price within the terms of the contract. 10 1 As the seller's pri-
mary interest is payment of the purchase price, this is usually
not a problem.
The situation is somewhat different where the seller
breaches a time obligation or the buyer's time breach is not re-
lated to its payment of the purchase price. Although Section
10(2) states that whether a time stipulation is of the essence
depends on the construction of the contract, courts in most
cases have held that time obligations are of the essence (or con-
ditions of the contract).10 2 This view is supported by the deci-
sion of the House of Lords in Bunge Corp. v. Tradax SA,
10 3
where the court held that time stipulations in mercantile con-
tracts will typically be considered to be of the essence and condi-
tions.'0 4 The policy rationale for this reasoning is to promote
certainty in commercial relationships. Each party should be
able to determine easily whether it is entitled to repudiate the
contract where there is a delay. By holding the parties strictly
to their time commitments (particularly the seller's delivery ob-
ligation), English law has avoided the necessity for a Nachfrist
notice before a contract can be repudiated. When a time stipu-
lation is breached,' 0 5 the innocent party is not obliged to deliver
a notice of any sort before being entitled to repudiate the
contract.
ii) Granting of additional time
If there has been a breach of a timing obligation where time
is considered of the essence, the non-breaching party (usually
the buyer) is still free to give the defaulting party (usually the
seller) additional time to perform its obligations. This granting
of additional time is considered a waiver by the party of its
strict rights under the contract, rather than being the
equivalent of a Nachfrist notice. Instead of the single step rep-
101 See SGA, supra note 13, § 49.
102 See GOODE, supra note 73, at 279; BRIDGE, supra note 31, at 214-219; M.
FURMSTON, CHESHIRE, FIFOOT AND FUMSTON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 567-568 (13th ed.
1996).
103 2 All E.R. 513, 540 (1981).
104 While this reasoning applies to both the obligations of the seller and the
buyer, no mention is made of the buyer's payment obligations in conjunction with
Section 10(1) of the SGA.
105 Except in respect of the buyer's payment obligation discussed above.
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resented by the delivery of a Nachfrist notice, English law re-
quires two steps: first, a waiver of the time obligation and
second, a new notice making time of the essence. 10 6
Where the innocent party has waived a timing breach, time
is no longer considered of the essence. This makes the result
the same as if time was never of the essence; the obligation
must be performed within a reasonable time. In England, eq-
uity has intervened in limited circumstances to assist the inno-
cent party. The case of Stickney v. Keeble107 is often cited for
the equitable proposition that, in contracts for the sale of land
the purchaser can give a notice to the vendor to complete in a
specified period, failing which the contract may be rescinded.
The purpose of this notice is regarded as making time (again) of
the essence,108 giving the notifying party the ability to avoid or
rescind the contract at the expiration of the notice period.
Stickney v. Keeble is a good illustration of the operation of
this principle. In that case, an agreement made on the 8th of
June for the sale of land provided for completion to occur on the
11th of October. When completion did not occur as scheduled,
and after repeated attempts to secure completion, the pur-
chaser gave notice to the vendors on the 30th of January the
following year that required completion to occur on or before the
13th of February. When completion again did not occur, the
purchaser rescinded the contract and brought a successful ac-
tion for return of its deposit. The key finding by the court in
that case was that the purchaser's actions and the time limits
provided were considered to be reasonable under the circum-
stances. Lord Parker stated the general basis for the decision
as follows:
It would be unjust and inequitable to allow the vendor to put for-
ward his own unnecessary delay in the face of the purchaser's fre-
quent requests for expedition as a ground for allowing him further
time or as rendering the time limited by such a notice as that to
which I have referred an unreasonable time.10 9
106 For terms considered conditions, the ability of the buyer to waive breaches
or treat them as breaches of warranty only are codified in Section 11(2) of the SGA.
107 1915 App. Cas. 386.
108 See FURMSTON, supra note 102, at 596; TREITEL, supra note 39, at 743-744.
109 See Stickney v. Keeble, 1915 App. Cas. 386, 419.
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Since Stickney v. Keeble, this concept has been applied in
the sale of goods context. The sale of goods case of Hartley v.
Hymans 110 held that, after the waiver by the buyer of the deliv-
ery period, the parties had implied a new agreement to extend
the period of delivery to a reasonable time of which notice was
to be given by the buyer to the seller. This is a slightly different
situation than a Nachfrist notice because it appears to make a
new implied agreement a prerequisite. More helpful is the case
of Charles Rickards v. Oppenhaim,111 where the Court of Ap-
peal accepted the reasoning in both Stickney v. Keeble and
Hartley v. Hymans to hold that, where a buyer of goods has
waived the time period for delivery, the buyer is subsequently
"entitled to give a notice bringing the matter to a head." 112 As
with a Nachfrist notice under the CISG, the notice period must
be reasonable. While not expressly stated in the judgment, it
can be implied that during such a period that the buyer cannot
pursue any other remedies. Denning L.J. stated:
If the defendant as he did, led the plaintiffs to believe that he
would not insist on the stipulation as to time, and that, if they
carried out the work, he would accept it, and they did it, he could
not afterwards set up the stipulation as to the time against them.
Whether it be called waiver or forbearance on his part, or an
agreed variation or substituted performance, does not matter. It
is a kind of estoppel. 113
If this reasoning is followed in respect to the initial waiver of a
time obligation, the waiver would appear to continue until such
time as any notice was delivered, thereby making time of the
essence.
From the above discussion, it can be seen that although the
reasoning and approach differ, a similar result would probably
be reached in most cases under the common law or under the
CISG. 114 Under both regimes, the innocent party can deliver a
notice, the validity of which is dependent on the reasonableness
of the innocent party's position and of the time period required.
110 3 K.B. 475 (1920).
111 1 K.B. 616 (1950).
112 Id. at 624 (per Denning L.J.).
11s Id. at 623.
114 See Zeigel & Samson, supra note 79 (pointing out that to the extent that the
seller has not relied upon the time extension, it is not binding on the buyer).
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Both structures give the defaulting party the protection of a
reasonable time, at the expense of the innocent party's certainty
of when a time period would be considered reasonable.
c) Potential Future Legal Directions
Article 3.106 (now 8.106) of the PECL fairly closely mirrors
the CISG in effect. It states:
(1) In any case of non-performance the aggrieved party may by
notice to the other party allow an additional period of time for
performance.
(2) During the additional period the aggrieved party may with-
hold performance of its own reciprocal obligations and may
claim damages, but it may not resort to any other remedy. If
it receives notice from the other party that the latter will not
perform within that period, or if upon expiry of that period
due performance has not been made, the aggrieved party may
resort to any of the remedies that may be available under
chapter 9.
(3) If in a case of delay in performance which is not fundamental
the aggrieved party has given a notice fixing an additional pe-
riod of time of reasonable length, it may terminate the con-
tract at the end of the period of notice. The aggrieved party
may in its notice provide that if the other party does not per-
form within the period fixed by the notice the contract shall
terminate automatically. If the period stated is too short, the
aggrieved party may terminate, or, as the case may be, the
contract shall terminate automatically, only after a reasona-
ble period from the time of the notice. 115
The provisions in both the CISG and the PECL can be viewed as
operating on a similar basis, subject to two main exceptions.
First, unlike the CISG, the innocent party under the PECL is
not limited to cases of non-delivery before it can rescind the con-
tract. Second, instead of having a separate provision dealing
with avoidance (Article 49(1)(b) in the CISG), the PECL in-
cludes the avoidance provisions within the Nachfrist article.
Likewise, Article 7.1.5 of the UNIDROIT Principles con-
tains a very similar provision to the PECL with some variance.
The UNIDROIT Principles include a de minimus threshold such
that a Nachfrist notice does not allow avoidance of the contract
115 PECL, supra note 26, art. 8.106.
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where the unperformed obligation is minor. 116 In this regard,
the UNIDROIT Principles more closely mirror the CISG. As
with the threshold under the UNIDROIT Principles, the CISG's
limitation of avoidance to cases of non-delivery can also be
viewed as a de minimus threshold because the rest of the
seller's obligations can be viewed as less important (or more
compensable by damages) than the delivery obligation.
Where a remedial scheme does not have a clear distinction
between obligations that allow for repudiation and those that do
not (such as conditions and warranties), some remedy is re-
quired in the cases where the delay is "borderline." Even within
such a scheme, there are instances where an innocent party can
be uncertain as to the remedies available to it. In these circum-
stances, the Nachfrist concept introduced from German law
seems to be a useful tool. While English law does not explicitly
have the same tool, it operates in a similar fashion once the in-
nocent party has waived a time obligation. The adoption of the
rules set forth in the CISG would cause minimal additional dif-
ficulty or confusion in this area of available remedies.
REDUCTION OF PRICE
A remedy allowing the buyer to pay a reduced price for de-
fective goods delivered by the seller has been recognised since
Roman times, under the Roman law remedy of actio quanti mi-
noris.117 As originally framed, where there was a latent or hid-
den defect in the goods purchased which reduced their value,
the buyer could sustain an action against the seller to reduce
the purchase price payable.11 The purpose of the remedy is to
allow the buyer to keep defective goods and pay the price it oth-
erwise would have paid had it been aware of the hidden defects
in the goods. 119 This remedy has since been carried forward
116 See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 21, art. 7.1.5.
117 See R. ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF
THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 318 (1996); TREITEL, supra note 43, at 107; E.E. Bergsten
& A.J. Miller, The Remedy of Reduction of Price, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 255-277, avail-
able in Pace CISG Database, supra note 14 (Jan. 15, 1998); Will, supra note 67, at
386.
118 See id.
119 See A.M. Tunon, The Actio Quanti Minoris and Sales of Goods Between
Mexico and the U.S.: An Analysis of the Remedy of Reduction of the Price in the UN
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into several of the main civil law codes. 120 Under these codes,
the remedy is particularly useful because unlike contractual
damages, the buyer can obtain the remedy without having to
prove fault on the part of the seller. 121
The right of a buyer to reduce the price payable is gener-
ally not calculated on the same basis as contractual damages, 122
and is different from a right to set-off which is also tied into
damages.1 23 Unlike damages-based remedies, the principle of
the price reduction remedy is not dependent on actual loss be-
ing suffered by the buyer, but is solely dependent on the ab-
stract relationship between the actual value of the goods
delivered and the hypothetical value of conforming goods.1 24
While neither English law nor the CISG have fully adopted
the traditional Roman law position, elements of the historical
remedy can be found in both systems, although through differ-
ent approaches. Since the CISG has gone further into incorpo-
rating a full price reduction remedy, the discussion below will
focus first on the elements of the CISG remedy.
a) CISG Provisions
Because the CISG was designed through compromises that
included both common law and civil law systems, it incorpo-
rates elements from both systems. Like the common law (and
unlike civil law systems), no fault is required to show breach of
contract for damages.1 25 At the same time, the CISG includes
the relatively traditional civil law remedy of reduction of price.
The key provision for this remedy can be found in Article 50,
which reads:
If the goods do not conform with the contract and whether or not
the price has already been paid, the buyer may reduce the price in
the same proportion as the value that the goods actually delivered
Sales Convention, CISG Article 50 and its Civil Law Antecedents, available in Pace
CISG Database, supra note 14 (Jan. 4, 1999).
120 See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 117, ch.10, pt. II. See also Article 1644 of the
French Code Civile and section 459 of the German BGB.
121 See HONNOLD, supra note 14, at 313.
122 Meaning, not on the expectation interest. See TREITEL, supra note 43, at
107-109.
123 See Bergsten & Miller, supra note 117.
124 See TREITEL, supra note 43, at 107-109.
125 See CISG, supra note 3, arts. 45(1)(b), 79.
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had at the time of the delivery bears to the value that conforming
goods would have had at that time. However, if the seller reme-
dies any failure to perform his obligations in accordance with arti-
cle 37 or article 48 or if the buyer refuses to accept performance by
the seller in accordance with those articles, the buyer may not
reduce the price. 126
While the committee drafting the CISG considered removing
this remedy as damages will usually serve the buyer better, it
was ultimately decided to retain the remedy because it was fa-
miliar to civil law systems and could benefit the buyer more in
certain circumstances. 127
i) General application
The question of whether the goods conform with the con-
tract can be determined in reference to Article 35, namely:
whether the goods are of the quality, quantity and description
required by the contract and generally fit for the purpose. 128 No
distinction is drawn in Article 50 between different types of
non-conformity. The same remedy applies regardless of the rea-
son of non-conformity. There is no difference between the ap-
proach to defects of quantity and defects of quality.
As with specific performance, Article 50 is drafted from the
perspective of the buyer. It is the buyer that has the option and
the power to reduce the price paid to the seller. While civil legal
systems require expert advice or the court to determine the dif-
ference in value between the contract price and the actual
value, the CISG gives this power of determination solely to the
buyer.129 On this basis, price reduction can be seen as a self-
help remedy that can be implemented by the buyer without any
requirement to have the determination upheld by a court, ex-
pert or other tribunal. In practice, however, this difference is
largely illusory. Any price reduction by the buyer must cer-
tainly be reasonable, otherwise it would be disputed by the
126 CISG, supra note 3, art. 50.
127 See COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS (CISG) 438-439 (P. Schlechtriem ed. 1998) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON
THE UN].
128 This author notes that there are four specific tests set forth in Article 35(2),
which mostly refer to fitness for purpose and packaging.
129 CISG, supra note 3, art. 50. Buyer may reduce price without any specified
determination of a third party. See id.
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seller and subject to review by a court. During these proceed-
ings, expert evidence would in all likelihood be adduced as to
the value of the goods. Additionally, the burden of proof as to
the value of the goods (both the value of delivered goods and
conforming goods) is squarely on the buyer. 130
The self-help view of the remedy is further reduced where
the buyer has already paid the purchase price. Article 50 ap-
plies whether or not the price has already been paid. If the
buyer chooses to reduce the price before it has paid, it can
merely deduct the difference in value from what it pays to the
seller. Where the price has already been paid, the buyer must
seek a refund from the seller for a portion of the purchase price.
This situation illustrates why most parties would prefer to be
the defendant in any action rather than the plaintiff. After all,
this is a much more onerous remedy than the buyer unilaterally
determining a price reduction and deducting it from the price it
pays to the seller.
In a study conducted in 1998 of ten cases from multiple ju-
risdictions using Article 50,131 it was found that Article 50 was
not used "offensively" by the buyer. Instead, the article was
predominately used as a counterclaim or a defence to an action
by the seller for the purchase price. 132 Such a result is in some
respects not surprising. Where there is no dispute between the
parties as to the amount of the reduction, the matter would not
come to court and the remedy would act in its intended manner:
as a self-help remedy available to the buyer. This way the rem-
edy avoids the costs and uncertainty of litigation.
The method of calculation of the price reduction is easier in
questions of defects in quantity rather than defects in quality.
When determining the "proportion as the value that the goods
actually delivered had . . . to the value that conforming goods
would have had," proportions of quantity can be easily calcu-
lated. 133 If the parties contract for the delivery of one hundred
apples, and the seller delivers ninety apples, the proportion is
nine-tenths, so the buyer is only responsible for paying ninety
percent of the purchase price. Where the quantity of apples de-
130 See COMMENTARY ON THE UN, supra note 127, at 443.
131 See Tunon, supra note 119.
132 See id.
133 CISG, supra note 3, art. 50.
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livered is accurate but the quality is questionable, the propor-
tion that the value of the non-conforming apples bears to
conforming apples can be difficult to calculate and could be the
subject of dispute between the buyer and the seller.
Where there is a dispute over the price to be paid, then the
matter could proceed to litigation. Once the matter proceeds to
litigation, the buyer who has already paid the purchase price
would in most cases seek the full level of damages for the
breach rather than merely reducing the price. Price reduction
would usually only come to light where the seller is making a
claim against the buyer for the purchase price and the buyer is
seeking to reduce or eliminate the obligation to pay the price. 134
As with the other remedies discussed in this article, price reduc-
tion can be obtained by the buyer under the CISG in conjunc-
tion with damages. 135 In most circumstances before a court,
seeking damages alone would give the buyer the largest recov-
ery, since, because damages are calculated on the basis of the
loss suffered by the buyer. 136 Price reduction alone is calculated
without reference to the loss suffered by the buyer, and, there-
fore, would not include common costs incurred by the buyer
(e.g., costs of mitigation, lost profit, etc.). On the other hand, a
claim in damages would typically include the loss in value suf-
fered by the buyer in receiving non-conforming goods. A buyer
would, therefore, be well advised to either seek damages alone
or damages in conjunction with price reduction to maximise its
remedy.
ii) Differences with damages
In some circumstances, the buyer would prefer to rely on
the price reduction remedy instead of damages. The most
straightforward situation is where the buyer has difficulty in
proving its loss, such as where it has purchased the goods for
altruistic/non-commercial purposes. 137 If, for example, the
buyer has purchased foodstuffs to donate to charity, it has not
necessarily suffered any loss from the diminution in value of the
non-conforming goods. Without any loss or necessarily the abil-
134 See infra Reduction of Price, regarding Section 53(1)(a) of the SGA.
135 See CISG, supra note 3, arts. 45(1)(b), 45(2).
136 See CISG, supra note 3, art. 74.
137 See COMMENTARY ON THE UN, supra note 127, at 438-439.
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ity to prove any damage, the buyer's preferred remedy would be
a reduction in the price to be paid to the seller.
The more contentious application of Article 50 in lieu of
damages is in conjunction with Article 79. Article 79 sets forth
various measures whereby a party (in this case, the seller) is
not liable for a failure to perform if that party can show that the
failure was due to an impediment beyond its control (i.e., force
majeure). Article 79(5) makes it clear that this exemption only
applies to claims for damages and that it does not prevent ei-
ther party from exercising any other remedy under the Conven-
tion. As Article 50 is separate from any claim for damages, the
buyer can still claim a price reduction for defects under those
circumstances. 138 For example, if a shipment of perishable
goods at the seller's risk is delayed in transit due to unforeseen
hostilities or labour action (so therefore outside of the seller's
control) and are reduced in value due to the delay, the buyer
has the choice to accept or reject the goods. If the buyer chooses
to accept the goods, he would be precluded from claiming dam-
ages from the seller pursuant to Article 79. The buyer's only
remedy would be to reduce the price payable pursuant to Article
50. Article 50 can thus be seen as an additional form of risk
allocation between the buyer and seller in these circumstances.
The policy rationale for such a rule is that it would otherwise be
unjust for the buyer to be forced to pay full price for non-con-
forming goods. 139
Perhaps the most important and frequently occurring situ-
ation is where the market price of the (conforming) goods has
changed substantially between the time of contracting and the
time of delivery. The method of calculating the price reduction
under Article 50 differs from the standard method of calculating
damages. The calculation method for price reduction has been
referred to as "proportionate," rather than "linear" or "abso-
lute" calculations for damages. 140 This difference can be best il-
lustrated by a practical example. 14 1 The seller contracts to sell
£100,000 worth of cheese. At the time of delivery, the cheese is
138 See HONNOLD, supra note 14, at 392-395; COMMENTARY ON THE UN, supra
note 127, at 438.
139 See Zeigel & Samson, supra note 79; HONNOLD, supra note 14.
140 See COMMENTARY ON THE UN, supra note 127, at 438.
141 See HONNOLD, supra note 14, at 391-395 (providing a version of this
example).
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slightly mouldy, worth approximately one-fifth of the value of
the contracted cheese. Under Article 50, the buyer can reduce
the price in proportion to the contract price, in this case one-
fifth of £100,000, or £20,000. Regardless of whether the price
rises or falls, the buyer is still able to purchase the delivered
cheese for £20,000 under Article 50. Under an "absolute" calcu-
lation for damages (the difference between the value of the
goods at delivery versus the value of conforming goods), the dif-
ference can vary depending on whether the price rises, falls or
stays the same. 142
If the market price of cheese stays the same as the contract
price, there would be no difference in the amount that could be
claimed as damages versus a price reduction under Article 50.
Where the price increases, the buyer would be best advised to
seek damages since the difference in value between what was
contracted for versus what was received would likely be greater
than the £80,000 difference calculated under Article 50. For ex-
ample, if the price of cheese doubles, the value of the con-
forming goods would be £200,000 versus a delivered value of
£40,000, a difference of £160,000. Conversely, Article 50 would
provide a greater benefit on a fall in market price. If the mar-
ket price halves, the value of delivered cheese would be £10,000
with a conforming value of £50,000, leading to a damages award
of only £40,000.
Of course, if there were a reduction in market price from
the time of contracting, the buyer would most likely reject the
goods, since it could obtain conforming replacement goods on
the open market at less than the contract price. The application
of Article 50 appears to give the buyer the upper hand, since it
can elect to pursue the remedy that offers it the highest return.
One must note that Article 50 is expressly made subject to the
seller's right to cure any defect under Article 48. This serves to
balance the position between buyer and seller so that the seller
has an opportunity to have some input into the resulting rem-
edy pursued by the buyer. The combination of these two reme-
142 The following discussion is premised on the assumption that the buyer is
not reselling the goods or otherwise suffers recoverable consequential loss, which
is not covered by Article 50 and can only be dealt with by a damages claim.
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dies can be viewed in light of the CISG's purpose to preserve the
parties' bargain wherever possible. 143
These examples show that Article 50 is of narrow applica-
bility in this "offensive" manner. In most cases, damages would
be the preferred remedy. Considering the limited number of
cases on this topic, it can be expected that in the future more
cases will come to light where the buyer seeks price reduction in
lieu of (or in conjunction with) damages where the purchase
price has already been paid. Particularly circumstances such as
those described above will come to be addressed.
The narrow application of Article 50 does throw some doubt
on the necessity for such a provision. Despite these concerns,
the worth of a provision should not be determined on the basis
of its frequency of use. Apart from its use as a familiar tool to
those comfortable with civil law systems, it does protect the
buyer from certain inequitable situations that would otherwise
not be properly remedied by damages alone.
iii) Ambiguities in Article 50
There is some uncertainty arising from the wording of Arti-
cle 50, as it is unclear whether it also covers other situations,
such as defects in title to the goods.' 4 4 For instance, can the
buyer claim a reduction in the price where the seller has failed
to deliver good title in the goods? While by no means clear, it
appears that Article 50 does not apply to defects in title. This
interpretation is supported by the wording of Article 50 itself,
which refers to goods not conforming to the contract.145 While
arguably a defect in title does not "conform to the contract," it is
more properly characterised as an obligation of the seller rather
than a particular character of the goods under the contract.
The buyer's ability to claim damages for any loss suffered is by
far a better remedy in such circumstances. These ambiguities
in scope of Article 50 also highlight the limited application of
the price reduction remedy under the CISG.
143 See Tunon, supra note 119, at 4.3. The consequences of the effect of Article
50 in these circumstances are discussed in Bergsten & Miller, supra note 117.
144 See HONNOLD, supra note 14, at 397.
145 See id., at 397-398; COMMENTARY ON THE UN, supra note 127, at 440-441.
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b) Contrasted with Traditional English Law Approach
While the exact remedy of price reduction based on actio
quanti minoris is unknown at English law, it does have some
parallels to existing remedies.
i) Defects of quantity
A general remedy of price reduction can be implied from
Sections 30 and 53 of the SGA. While Section 30 refers only to
delivery of the wrong quantity, it follows the same general prin-
ciple. For example, if the seller has delivered less than the con-
tracted quantity of goods and the buyer accepts the goods, the
buyer must "pay for them at the contract rate."146 The refer-
ence to "contract rate" is comparable to the "proportional" calcu-
lations made under Article 50 of the CISG. If the parties have
specified a contract rate for each item delivered, that rate would
also determine the proportion of value that the goods delivered
had to the conforming quantity.
Where there is a delivery of a lesser amount, Section 30 of
the SGA would likely reach the same result as Article 50, as
illustrated by an example given in the CISG Secretariat Com-
mentary. 147 A seller contracts to deliver ten tons of corn at a
market price of $200 a ton for a total of $2000, but instead deliv-
ers nine tons. The buyer accepts the ten tons and reduces the
price by ten percent, paying $1800 instead. Whether the result
is characterised by way of contract price (9 tons times $200 =
$1800) or proportionality (9/10 of $2000 = $1800), the buyer is
responsible for paying the same amount. Thus each of the
methods of calculation/characterisation under the CISG and the
SGA for defects in quantity reach the same amount of price
reduction.
ii) Breaches of warranty and defects of quality
Section 53 also contemplates a similar concept to Article 50,
though it applies only to breaches of warranty and is phrased in
terms of setting off the breach against the price due. Unlike the
CISG, there is no general right on the part of the buyer to re-
duce the price unless set up as a defence to the seller's action for
146 SGA, supra note 13, § 30(1).
147 See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 41, at 42.
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the price.1 48 However, as with the CISG, the reduction of price
remedy applies at the option of the buyer in lieu of a claim for
damages. There is also a specific provision in the SGA dealing
with valuation where the breach is in respect of quality obliga-
tions. Section 53(3) states that, prima facie, the loss is the dif-
ference in value of the goods at the time of delivery between the
delivered value and the contracted value. This is an implemen-
tation of the "linear" or "absolute" calculation of damages,
which reflects the standard method of calculating damages
rather than the proportional method of Article 50. Where there
has been a market price change (either a rise or fall) from the
contract price, the difference in value test could reach a differ-
ent result than the proportionality test. This would not neces-
sarily hold true in all circumstances, since Section 53(3) only
states that the loss is "prima facie" the difference in value. An
English court is allowed to make an award on a different basis.
This basis could conceivably include the proportionality test as
in Article 50, since proportionality is implicitly recognised in
Section 30 of the SGA for defects of quantity.
Even without a specific remedy comparable to Article 50,
English law probably reaches the same result as the CISG in
most cases where there is a breach of a warranty.1 49 Practically
speaking, if a buyer receives defective goods of a lesser quality
than contracted, which it otherwise wishes to accept, it can ne-
gotiate with the seller for a reduced price. This negotiation can
take place before or after the purchase price has been paid and
might take the form of the buyer paying a lesser amount to the
seller. If the seller accepts this price reduction or the lesser
amount paid to it, the price under the sales contract can be con-
sidered modified to that effect. In the circumstance where the
price reduction is not agreed, the buyer or the seller can com-
mence legal action to enforce its rights through a damages
claim. Where the seller commences the action, the buyer can
seek to set off the amount owing pursuant to Section 53(1)(a),
which has also been reflected in the cases decided under Article
50 of the CISG. Where the buyer commences the action, it will
in most circumstances seek damages in the same manner as
148 See BRIDGE, supra note 31, at 591.
149 In particular, where the only remedy concerned is price reduction or
damages.
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parties have been under the CISG (even though the CISG con-
tains the Article 50 remedy).
Where the remedy would differ would be in the more lim-
ited circumstances described above, namely: where the buyer
accepts the goods and (1) the buyer is unable to prove damages,
(2) force majeure, and (3) the market price of conforming goods
increases between the time of the contract and the time of deliv-
ery. These are the circumstances under the CISG where the
price reduction remedy of Article 50 differs from an award of
damages, and the same difference would hold true between Ar-
ticle 50 and damage awards under the SGA.
iii) Partial frustration /force majeure
Section 7 of the SGA roughly serves the same purpose as
Article 79 of the CISG. 150 Where Section 7 does not apply, such
as where the contract is not for specific goods, or force majeure
other than the perishing of goods, the general doctrines of frus-
tration and construction of the contract would apply. 151 While
the scope of this article does not allow for a full discussion of the
implications of Section 7 and the differences between the doc-
trine of frustration and the damage exclusion provisions of Arti-
cle 79, both serve to exclude liability of the seller for the
perishing or damaging of the goods in circumstances beyond the
seller's control. But what about the situation where the goods
have partially perished?
On this point, English law is unclear. The orthodox view is
that Section 7 would fully discharge both parties from the con-
tract.152 Where there is a shortfall in quantity resulting from
goods perishing, the discharge of all contractual obligations
would preclude the buyer from demanding delivery of and ac-
cepting part of the goods if that was all that was available.
There would be no opportunity for the parties to seek to reduce
the price under Section 30(1) for the reduced quantity delivered
(as with Article 50 of the CISG).
150 Section 7 of the SGA reads "[w]here there is an agreement to* sell specific
goods and subsequently the goods, without any fault on the part of the seller or
buyer, perish before the risk passes to the buyer, the agreement is avoided." SGA,
supra note 13, § 7.
151 See, e.g., Kursell v. Timber Operators and Contractors Ltd. 1 K.B. 298
(1927).
152 See BRIDGE, supra note 31, at 135.
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Little additional clarity can be found from the pre-"codifica-
tion" cases under the SGA. Section 7 has been described as be-
ing a codification of the principle found in Howell v.
Coupland.153 In that case, the parties had contracted for the
delivery of 200 tons of potatoes from the seller's land (which was
expected to produce over 400 tons). The crop failed due to dis-
ease and the land produced only 80 tons, which were all deliv-
ered to the buyer. The buyer sued for damage resulting from
the non-delivery of the other 120 tons. The decision of the ma-
jority turned upon the construction of the contract and Coler-
idge C.J. held that the contract was "to deliver so many
potatoes, of a particular kind, grown on a specific place, if deliv-
erable from that place."154 Based on that reasoning, the seller
was not held liable for the non-delivery, which is similar to a
result that would be reached under the CISG. However, this
decision turned largely on the construction of the contract,
which was interpreted to contemplate a reduced quantity, so
partial frustration was not really an issue. Where there is no
issue of partial frustration on questions of quantity, arguably
Section 30(1) would apply if the buyer demanded and received
delivery of the lesser quantity. Additionally, this case does not
even appear to fall within the later-drafted provisions of Section
7 of the SGA, since an ungrown crop of potatoes (a portion of the
anticipated crop) would not normally be considered specific
goods.
However, in a more recent case outside of Section 7 (where
the goods were non-specific), H.R. & S. Sainsbury Ltd. v.
Street,155 the court held that the buyer was allowed to call for
delivery of a reduced crop. In this case, no goods were actually
delivered and the buyer was able to claim damages for non-de-
livery of the goods actually available. While there was no deliv-
ery, the decision that the parties can continue to have a contract
for a reduced quantity (not dependent on the construction of the
contract) suggests that a similar result as envisaged under Arti-
cle 50 would be reached in those circumstances. This is sup-
153 1 Q.B.D. 258. The author notes that this position is set forth in A. Dia-
mond, Force Majeure and Frustration under International Sales Contracts, re-
printed in FORCE MAJEURB AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 166-167 (E.
McKendrick ed., 2d ed. 1995).
154 Howell, 1 Q.B.D. 258, 261.
155 1 W.L.R. 834 (1972).
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ported by Section 1(3) of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts)
Act 1943, which requires recipients of a "valuable benefit" (such
as a buyer receiving goods) to pay a just sum as determined by
the court. However, that Act expressly does not apply to con-
tracts considered frustrated under Section 7 of the SGA.156 It
would be odd if in fact the result differs in situations where Sec-
tion 7 applies, but there is uncertainty in English law on these
points. The amount to be awarded under that provision also
cannot necessarily be concretely ascertained by the parties,
since it would be at the court's discretion. Finally, each of these
cases has dealt with problems arising outside of the seller's con-
trol which affect the quantity of the goods, which are arguably
already covered in Section 30(1) of the SGA. There would ap-
pear to be even more ambiguity where the supervening event
reduced the market price of the delivered goods for another rea-
son, such as defects in quality. Adoption of the CISG would
serve to clarify all of these matters. 157
The practical issue to be faced in the tension between force
majeure/frustration and damages in either the CISG or the SGA
is the limited effect that ambiguities in the law would have on
commercial parties. In most international sales contracts,
whether they are a standard form or specifically negotiated, the
parties will include some form of force majeure clause, often tai-
lored to suit different situations. Since the parties will usually
have agreed how to deal with these extraordinary situations,
the effect of any uncertainty in the application of the law will be
limited. Despite this, any legal regime should try to minimise
any ambiguities for such rare circumstances.
c) Potential Future Legal Directions
Since the price reduction remedy is such a fundamental
concept in civilian legal systems, it seems certain that any fu-
ture efforts on the unification of contract or sale of goods law
will contain some form of this remedy. Whether these efforts
156 See Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 § 2(5)(c).
157 See BRIDGE, supra note 31, at 133-134 (discussing the question of partial
frustration of quality obligations and arriving at a similar conclusion). Quality
obligations are even more unclear, considering the interplay between Sections 7
and 14 of the SGA.
20001
41
PACE INT'L L. REV.
will necessarily reflect the approach of the CISG (without any
fault requirement) is still to be determined.
To date, the unification efforts of the PECL for the reduc-
tion of price remedy are fairly similar to the CISG in approach.
Though the language differs, this can be seen in Article 4.401
(now 9.401) of the PECL:
(1) A party who accepts a tender of performance not conforming
to the contract may reduce the price. This reduction shall be
proportionate to the decrease in the value of the performance
at the time this was tendered compared to the value which a
conforming tender would have had at that time.
(2) A party who is entitled to reduce the price under the preced-
ing paragraph and who has already paid a sum exceeding the
reduced price may recover the excess from the other party.
(3) A party who reduces the price cannot also recover damages for
reduction in the value of the performance but remains entitled
to damages for any further loss it has suffered so far as these
are recoverable under Section 5 of this Chapter.
As with the CISG, paragraph (1) above adopts the propor-
tionality measure for the price reduction, measured at the time
of delivery. Likewise, paragraph (2) is intended to allow a party
such as the buyer to recover the amount of the price reduction
once it has been paid. Finally, paragraph (3) makes it clear that
the claimant cannot demand both the price reduction plus dam-
ages for the reduction in value. While there is no express
equivalent to paragraph (3) in Article 50 of the CISG, the two
provisions would likely have the same effect. 158
Interestingly enough, the UNIDROIT Principles contain no
equivalent remedy to Article 50 of the CISG. There is no expla-
nation within the UNIDROIT Principles for the reason for this
exclusion, which might be due to the limited role the remedy
plays when damages are readily available and not dependent on
fault. The fact that the price reduction remedy has not been
included can be interpreted to mean that price reduction may
not be a remedy in future private law harmonisations. How-
ever, given the importance and familiarity of the remedy to ci-
158 See HONNOLD, supra note 14, at 394. This is also consistent with the fact
that Article 75 contemplates for loss suffered as a consequence of breach. If the
buyer has already been "compensated" by price reduction, it would not be able to
claim that amount again, since it had not suffered a loss in that regard.
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vilian legal systems, this is not necessarily the case. In contrast
to the UNIDROIT Principles, the European context (with its
predominance of civil law systems) outside of the PECL gives
further support to the actio quanti minoris continuing to play a
role in future legal developments. In its draft directive on
Guarantees for Consumer Goods, 159 the European Commission
has included as one of the remedies a price reduction remedy
similar to Article 50 of the CISG.
Another possible explanation for the exclusion of a price re-
duction remedy in the UNIDROIT Principles is the scope of cov-
erage of those Principles. The actio quanti minoris is one of the
earliest consumer protection remedies and exemptions to the
caveat emptor principle, originally designed to protect buyers
from latent defects in goods (typically slaves). As consumer pro-
tection legislation, it would have a place in any Consumer
Goods directive and the PECL, which are both intended to cover
all contracts, not just commercial ones. Since the UNIDROIT
Principles only cover international commercial contracts, it
could be argued that there would be a lesser need for such pro-
tection. If this were the sole basis, there would likewise be little
reason to include such principles in the CISG and/or as an addi-
tion to English sales law. However, the price reduction remedy
has grown beyond its original scope of consumer protection and
an examination of the situations where it is useful to the com-
mercial buyer (such as those discussed above) indicates that
there is a role for the remedy to play in modern commercial law.
Whether with or without the potential of future application
of the price reduction remedy, from the traditional common law
perspective there is a great deal of existing support for similar
remedies. While there is some potential for overlap with a
claim for damages, price reduction is a useful element in the
buyer's arsenal and helps protect the buyer with a remedy that
can in principle be exercised by the buyer without having to re-
sort to a court. The uncertainties introduced by Article 50 are
not significant and the provision can be assimilated into En-
glish sales law without too many conflicts or resulting
uncertainty.
159 See COM (1998) 217, art. 3.4.
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CONCLUSION
The basis of English sale of goods law is the SGA, which
was originally passed over one hundred years ago. Many of the
concepts contained therein are significantly older than that.
Since the adoption of the SGA, commercial transactions have
increased in volume, complexity and their international charac-
ter. To expect Nineteenth Century or earlier legislation to deal
with Twenty-first Century transactions is perhaps asking too
much.160 At minimum, the SGA should be expanded and
amended to deal with modern technical and commercial
developments. 16 1
By way of contrast, the CISG is a much more modern docu-
ment, developed in light of the international character and com-
plexity of current trade practices. The remedies adopted in the
CISG reflect more recent developments in practice and law and
borrow heavily from a variety of legal systems. This combina-
tion of concepts and compromise between the positions of the
drafters of the Convention has also led to some ambiguity and
uncertainty in application rather than resulting in a consistent
legal regime.
Even within such ambiguities, the remedies of specific per-
formance, price reduction and Nachfrist which are introduced
by the CISG and are different from or new to English law do
serve a useful purpose and add to the protection of the con-
tracting parties in certain circumstances. Additionally, these
remedies are sometimes even more certain than their existing
counterparts under English law. At the very least, the CISG
remedies can be seen as consistent with other efforts at
harmonising and unifying contract law, as represented by the
PECL and the UNIDROIT Principles.
No international commercial legal regime can expect to be
perfect, especially when it is developed on the basis of compro-
mise between legal systems. To some extent the CISG does jus-
tify the criticisms of Mr. Justice Hobhouse, referred to in the
160 See GOODE, supra note 73, at 1205-1212 (further discussing this position).
161 In the Canadian province of Ontario, the Law Reform Commission re-
viewed its Sale of Goods Act (modeled on the original SGA) and made arguments
and recommendations in favour of changing its Act, which in many cases reflected
the policy decisions made in the CISG. See Ontario Law Reform Commission,
supra note 71 (especially vol. I. ch. 3).
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Introduction, and mirrors the somewhat unrealistic efforts to
make Esperanto a universal language. But the comparison
with Esperanto is misleading. Parties are generally less willing
to adopt another's legal regime in their dealings than they are
another's language. To avoid the need to adopt each other's le-
gal structure or an unfamiliar third one, the parties can
choose 162 to adopt the neutral regime represented by the CISG.
So while the remedies provided for by the CISG might not re-
present part of the "consistent and universal form of interna-
tional mercantile law" desired by Lord Mansfield 163 or a modern
lex mercatoria, they do represent a step forward in that process.
The lack of perfection or total certainty of the CISG as a
complete legal regime is not a reason for England to fail to
adopt it. As illustrated above, the SGA has as much, if not
more, uncertainty in the scope and application of some of its
remedies as the CISG. On the question of remedies, the CISG
can be seen as a step forward in the development and
harmonisation of English law in conjunction with the majority
of the United Kingdom's trading partners. While this article
has focused on particular remedies, there is certainly scope
within the rest of the CISG to consider whether it represents a
worthwhile change or addition to English sale of goods law in
other areas.
Attempts to analyse the CISG in light of English law and
other international unifying regimes can give English parties
and English courts some idea of the directions in which English
sales law may be heading, not only on the question of available
remedies. Given the useful purposes shown in this article for
the addition of the CISG remedies to English sales law, such
discussions may even serve to reduce any reluctance within the
English legal or business communities to implement the CISG.
Neither English law nor English parties exist in isolation,
nor can they afford to. Internationalisation is ongoing, both in
trade and in legal developments. This internationalisation is
particularly relevant when viewed in the context of the Euro-
pean Union and England's role within it. The continuing
harmonisation and unification of EU laws on grounds that ap-
162 The CISG also automatically applies in a large number of international
sales contracts pursuant to Article 1.
163 See infra Introduction.
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pear to fit well with the CISG, such as the PECL and the draft
directive on Consumer Guarantees, give added support to
adopting the CISG as an addition to existing English law.
Adoption would also give English courts the opportunity to help
develop the international (and European) jurisprudence on the
concepts advanced in the CISG, including remedies. It is time
for English law to move forward from the SGA and add the con-
siderable expertise and influence of English courts in develop-
ing a new European and international lex mercatoria, of which
the CISG is only a preliminary step.
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